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This is the first study applying the econometric analysis of piecewise-linear 
budget constraints arising from space-linked property taxation to Japanese 
housing data. The model employed is the classical Hausman type with 
convex piecewise-linear budget constraints  and  fixed preferences. We 
estimate that if spaced-linked property taxation for newly built houses is 
abolished, it would then eliminate a current excess tax burden per 










In this paper we will study the effects of Japanese differential property tax 
treatment. At present, the property tax rate for newly built houses of floor 
space up to a certain range is lower than the usual rate.  This difference is 
important given the fact that  the market for used houses is small when 
compared with the market for newly built houses
1. Since the ratio of newly 
built houses that are purchased is larger than those obtained by other means, 
                                                 
1 Housing Survey of Japan (Statistics Bureau, 1993) reports that among the total houses 
purchased during  the 1988 to 1993 period in Japan,  only 2.5% is for used houses while 
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the current Japanese property taxation system could potentially distort the 
purchasing decisions of home buyers. We will analyze the effects of those 
space-linked property taxation on consumers’ floor s pace demand by 
explicitly considering nonlinearities in budget constraints and calculate the 
excess burden on each household created by the present property taxation 
system. In addition, we will propose some modifications to the present 
Japanese property taxation system that will remove any such distortions. 
 
This is the first study to apply the econometric analysis of piecewise-linear 
budget constraints arising from space-linked property taxation to Japanese 
housing data. The model employed is the classical Hausman type with convex 
piecewise-linear budget constraints and fixed preferences. Although there 
have been several housing studies in Japan and the U.S. that explicitly 
consider nonlinearities in budget constraints, these nonlinearities arise due to 
the space-linked subsidized interest rates of Japan Housing Loan Corporation 
[see Seko  (1993, 1994, 1996)] and also to such government programs as 
housing gap plans [see Hausman and Wise (1980)], moving costs [see Venti 
and Wise  (1984)] and progressive income taxes  [see MacRae and Turner 
(1981)]. In our paper, the nonlinearities come from the space-linked property 
taxation. The space-linked property taxation system is unique to Japan as far 
as I know and thus this is the first study to address this type of nonlinearity.  
 
The organization of the remainder of this paper is as follows.  Section 2  
presents a nonlinear budget constraint arising from property taxation and 
some evidence based on data analysis.  Section 3 discusses the data sources 
and defines the variables. Section 4 presents a structural form estimation 
model of floor space demand when an explicit nonlinear budget constraint is 
specified. Section 5 presents policy simulations and analyzes efficiency 




Nonlinear Budget Constraints Arising from Property Taxation 
 
At present, in Japan, the property tax rate for newly built houses of floor 
space between 40 m
2 and 200m
2 is lower than the usual tax rate. The tax 
reduction eligibility applies to newly built houses of up to 200m
2 , but the 
actual reduction rate applies only to floor space from 40m
2 to 120m
2 . The 
remainder is taxed at the same rate as houses of over 200m
2 and second-hand 
houses
 , for which there is no such reduction. 
 
We assume consumers obtain utility from housing services h and other 
goods C. Housing services h consists of all the things one considers when Property Taxation and the Demand for Floor Space in Japan 37 
 
purchasing a home. We divide housing services  h into two categories, 
quantity of floor space, F, and all other attributes, I, which we will call quality. 
That is, h = h(F,I). 
 
For newly built houses the consumer budget constraint is  
     ) )( ( ) ( 5 . 0 ) ( ) ( F F I P F I P F I P de r C Y H H H - + + - + + = t t p   (1) 
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where  Y is real permanent income, r is interest rate, de is the depreciation 
rate,t is the property tax rate, p is inflation rate, P I H ( ) is the real unit price of 
housing and assumed to depend upon quality I .  F  is the tax reduction 
eligible floor space. We assume property tax rate t  is reduced to half for 
eligible newly built houses. This property tax reduction is presented in the 
third and fourth terms of the right-hand side of equation (1). 
As for other kinds of houses the budget constraint becomes: 
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The budget constraint defined by (1) and (2) is portrayed in Figure 1 in (C, F) 
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where UC(I) is the real user cost of capital of owner-occupied housing (i.e. 
floor space) and Y
~
 is the value of the vertical intercept. 
 
Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of housing floor space. Casual 
observation indicates that space-linked property taxation has a powerful 
effect on the distribution of floor space demand, because demand for floor 
space levels are much greater around 110m
2 levels which are close to the 
kinks points of the nonlinear budget constraints in Figure 1 .     
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Fig.1  Floor Space Demand Model  
 Nonlinear Budget (C,F) Space (I Constant) 
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Notes:  F=floor space; C=composite goods; Y=real income; UC(I)=the   real user cost of 
capital of owner-occupied housing; PH(I)=the real  unit price of housing; I=quality of 
housing; r=interest rate; de=the depreciation rate; t=the property tax rate; p=inflation 
rate; F  =the tax reduction eligible floor space. 
 
 





















Our primary data source is the Housing Demand Survey of 1993 for the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Area conducted by the Ministry of Construction. This survey 
represents a sample of households in 1993 and includes the following 
variables for all households: date of move to present living quarters, tenure of 
present dwelling, number of members in the household, number of rooms in 
the present residence, current  income, place of present residence, commuting 
time, age of the head of the household and housing costs. In addition to the 
variables available for all households, the Survey includes additional 
information on recent movers -- specifically households that moved into their 
present dwelling after 1989 (i.e. "recent movers"). For recent movers, the 
Survey includes the following variables in previous residence: status of 
previous residence, number of household members, number of rooms, 
household type and housing costs. The sample is limited to recent movers.  I 
exclude from the sample households which the Survey shows as having 
changed their residence without also indicating a change of location. That is, 
I exclude the sample households which have rebuilt their houses at the same 
places. 
 
 The unit price of owner-occupied housing, PH , was constructed from 
construction and land price data based on the following formula, 
   
N L L L H p k p k P ln ) 1 ( ln ln - + =                           (5) 
where  pL is land price per square meter of lot, pN is construction cost per 
square meter of floor space and kL is the ratio of the value of the structure to 
the total value of the house.  We assumed kL is 0.5 based on the average in 
the Survey.  For pL we use data from the Survey of Prefectural Land Prices 
(Land Agency).    For  pN we use data from the  Construction Statistics 
Yearbook (Ministry of Construction). pL is city, town or village specific and 
pN is prefecture
2  specific. That is, each household in the sample was assigned 
pL and pN for the prefecture, city, town, or village in which it resides. The data 
for all these variables is taken from the year that each household has moved 
to the present owner-occupied dwelling.   
 
Next, we calculate the housing stock, H(F,I), which is assumed to depend on 
F and I, as follows: 







=                                (6) 
where PH(1)F is the purchase price paid by each household from the Survey. 
H(F,I), as constructed above, is the  quality adjusted quantity, capturing 
                                                 
2 It corresponds to British county. 40  Seko 
   
quality variations other than location-specific land and construction price 
variations. As housing services h(F,I) is proportional to H(F,I), the quantity 
of housing services consumed by each household will also be a quality 
adjusted quantity. 
 
We construct the quality index, I, by dividing, H(F,I), by quantity F, the floor 
space, and then substituting (6) to obtain: 
      I
H F I
F
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From (7),  P I I P H H ( ) = ·  where we assume I is constant. 
 
As for the user cost of capital UC(I) in (3),  r was set at the private housing 
loan rate at the time of entering the present dwelling, de to 0.0255 for wooden 
houses and 0.01395 for nonwooden houses and, p, to the rate of increase of 
the residential housing deflator. The effective tax rate, t , was derived based 
on each prefecture’s effective land and structure property tax rate as follows:  
  [ ] 014 . 0 7 . 0 ) / ( · · + · = N L k value market value assessment tax property k t     (8) 
Each household in the sample was assigned UC(I) based on its floor space 
according to (3).     
 
Since we only  know current income, i.e. income in the survey year, we 
constructed income at the time of move by deflating current income by the 
CPI.  It may be appropriate to construct permanent income data for Y if data 
becomes available, but as we only have the means from each income bracket, 
I used current income due to data limitations.      
 
Real income and real user cost are constructed by dividing this deflated 
income and nominal user cost by the price of other goods and services, Q. 
The data for Q are taken from the National Survey of Prices. Q is city, town or 
village specific and taken from the time of relocation to the present dwelling. 
That is, each household in the sample was assigned Q for the city, town, or 
village in which it resided at the time of move.  
 
As for socioeconomic variables, we use the age of the head of household and 
the number of household members. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of 
the data  set and summarizes the characteristics of the sample.  Average 
nominal income per household is about 8,120,000 yen and average floor space 
of owner-occupied house per household is about 91 m
2. Property Taxation and the Demand for Floor Space in Japan 41 
 
Table 1:   Characteristics of Data 
 
     
Sample size    403.00 
     
Age of head (years old)    40.90 
    (9.6) 
     
Unit price of owner-occupied housing    26.40 
(per squared meter)( PH ) (10 thousand yen)  (11.1) 
     
Income(nominal) (10 thousand yen)    812.70 
    (307.6) 
     
Virtual income(real)(VY)* (10 thousand yen)  7.60 
    (2.8) 
     
Virtual user cost of capital of owner-occupied housing (VUC(I))*  32.00 
(yen)    (17.0) 
     
Household member (person)    3.51 
    (1.3) 
     
Floor space(F) (m
2)     91.00 
    (35.7) 
     
Quality (I)    0.21 
    (0.086) 
     
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  





We specify the floor space demand function as: 
     
F F D a Y I UC a a F F e b e + + + + = + = 3 1 0
* ) (     (9) 
where F
*is desired floor space,  D denotes demographic variables , ? F is a 
stochastic term with mean zero and a a a 0 1 3 , , , b are all parameters. 
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The unique feature of our model is our inclusion of nonlinear budget 
constraints caused by the space-linked property taxation. In this paper, we 
will follow the piecewise linear approach developed by Hausman and others. 
[See Hausman (1979, 1985), Moffitt (1990) and Pudney (1989).]  
 
The advantages of this approach over the simple reduced form estimation of 
demand functions are numerous. Firstly, we have shown that there are many 
observations at kink points in the data analysis. [See Figure 2.]  Ignoring 
observations at these kinks will probably lead to a selection bias. Secondly, 
the simple reduced form estimation is an unsatisfactory approach because 
OLS estimates will be inconsistent. The error term in the floor demand 
equation will be correlated with right hand side variables such as income and 
price variables,  because they are partly selected by the individual in their 
choice of segment. Thirdly, we need to know the consumer’s preferences or, 
equivalently, its utility function for the comparative statics. Note that the 
comparative statics of consumer demand in the usual sense holds up in the 
presence of kinked budget sets only within segments. 
 
We examine the floor space demand model with fixed preferences and 
convexified budget constraints. We assume a a a 0 1 3 , , , b  are the same for all 
individuals. Desired floor space will usually depend on the complete vectors 
of both virtual prices (in this case virtual user cost) and virtual incomes. For 
simplicity, we convexify the budget set by taking its convex hull. A floor 
space demand model should include individual maximization of utility over the 
nonlinear budget set and account properly for the multiplicity of virtual user 
cost and virtual incomes.        
 
Since the budget set is convex and preferences are strictly convex, there 
exists a unique global maximum to the individual’s utility maximization 
problem for the desired floor space. We need only ascertain where the 
tangency occurs. The problem to be solved in econometric estimation is to 
find desired floor space, F
*, when the individual is faced with the convex 
budget set, with m linear segments,  Jk , for k=1,…,m.  To find F
* , the 
specification of desired floor space on a given budget segment,  Jk , is taken: 
      D a I VUC a a VY I VUC f F VY k k k k k 3 ] [ ] [ 1 0 ] [ ] [
* ) ( ) , ) ( ( + + + = = b   (10) 
For  each extended segment of the individual’s budget constraint, we can 
calculate the desired floor space,  F f VUC I VY k k k
*
[ ] [ ] ( ( ) , ) = .  The budget set is 
described by, 
*
] [ ] [ ) ( k k k F I VUC VY C - =  where VUC I k ( )[ ] is the virtual real user 
cost corresponding to the k-th segment and VY k [ ] is the corresponding virtual 
income. Let Fk [ ] represent the amount of floor space at the first kink point in Property Taxation and the Demand for Floor Space in Japan 43 
 
segment k, see Figure 1.  If we compute F f VUC I VY k k k
*
[ ] [ ] ( ( ) , ) = and find 
} { ] [ ] 1 [
*
k k k k k F F F F J where J F < < = ˛ - ,  then Fk
* must be the unique global 
maximum. If  F J k k
* ˇ , then the optimum must be on some other segment, at a 
corner, or at one of the kinks. Given the Japanese housing tax system, the 
user cost of capital, income, and preferences, it is possible to compute the 
optimum choice. [For details, see Hausman (1979).]  
 
Because of optimization and/or measurement errors, observed floor space F
i 
for i-th household is given by,    




* e                                     (11) 
where eF
i  is a stochastic term distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 
s F
2  and the superscript indexes the households. Given a household’s budget 
set and preferences, it is possible to compute the global optimum  F
* as 
described above. The likelihood function of this model is,  


















*                           (12) 
where f( ) ￿ denotes the standard normal p.d.f. 
If the floor space demand function given by (9) is to be consistent with the 
hypothesis of utility maximization, it must satisfy the condition 
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We maximize the log-likelihood function subject to (13). The maximum of the 
log-likelihood function is numerically estimated with the Berndt-Hall-Hall-
Hausman method in TSP
3.  We used several starting values for the maximum 
likelihood estimation to assure a global optimum.  
 
We present in Table 2 the estimation results when the floor demand function 
was estimated using a linear budget constraint and when the kinked budget 
constraint is controlled for in the manner described in this section. The former 
approach estimated the “marginal” floor demand function directly, that is, the 
demand functions that describe choice within segments by applying OLS.  
This "marginal" demand function shows the amount the individual would 
demand if the individual were to face a completely linear constraint with slope 
and intercept at that segment
4.  
 
All explanatory variables are significantly different from zero with the 
expected signs.  For instance, floor demand increases with the number of 
                                                 
3 Time Series Processor, Version 4.4 (TSP International). 
4 See Moffitt (1990, pp. 129-131) for details. 44  Seko 
   
household members. Price elasticity is –0.22 and income elasticity is 0.17 
under the kinked budget constraint model. These elasticities are computed on 
a household basis and have the expected sign although they apply only to 
points lying strictly on the interior of the segments. 
 
Table 2  Parameter Estimates of Floor Space Demand Model 
 




   (Kinked Budget 
Constraints) 
Constant      25.100**    25.110** 
      (2.810)    (2.820) 
Age of head  ?  1.040**    1.043** 
      (6.300)    (6.330) 
Price    -  -4829.600**    -4997.100** 
      (-5.080)    ( -4.980) 
Income     +  1.731**    1.756** 
      (2.900)    (2.940) 
Household member   +  7.241**    7.219** 
      (5.540)    (5.560) 
sF      31.480    31.300** 
          (28.400) 
lnL      -1986.400    -1959.200 
Price elasticity    -0.210    -0.220 
Income elasticity    0.160    0.170 
   ** Significant at the 1% level. 
   Note : Numbers in parentheses are asymptotic t value. 
 
There are several important differences when we compare the kinked budget 
constraint model with the linear budget constraint model in Table 2. The price 
elasticity under the kinked budget constraint model equals  –0.22, as 
compared to an elasticity of –0.21 in the linear model. Though this difference 
is not large, it is consistent with our prior expectation that consideration for 
the kink explicitly should increase the estimated price elasticity. There is a 
11% reduction in the standard error on the price elasticity when the kink is 
explicitly considered. The income elasticity under the kinked budget 
constraint equals 0.17, up from 0.16 under the linear budget constraint 
(though the difference is not statistically significant). There is a 10% 
reduction in the standard error on the income elasticity under the kinked 
budget constraint.     Property Taxation and the Demand for Floor Space in Japan 45 
 
 
It is also expected that the coefficient on the household member would be 
biased under the linear budget constraint model, because this variable reflects 
at least some of the size effects for home owners. That is to say, as the family 
size increases, the floor demand increases and vice versa. Thus the 
coefficient on the household member under the kinked budget constraint 
model is reduced (although this change is not statistically different from the 





In this section, we attempt to assess the impact on housing decisions of a 
modification of the Japanese differential property tax system and assess the 
efficiency effects resulting from this change. That is, we calculate the 
changes in floor space demand and compute the current excess burden when 
spaced-linked property taxation for newly built houses is abolished and the 
same usual property tax rate is imposed on all kinds of houses irrespective of 
the size of their floor spaces.   
 
Simulation was conducted under the kinked budget constraint model and the 
linear budget constraint model. Change in floor space under the kinked 
budget constraint model was calculated as follows. First, desired floor space 
demand 
i F
* for i-th household under the present differential tax system was 
computed using (9) based on the search algorithm described in section 4 by 
putting the estimated parameter values in Table 2 into (9). Next, desired floor 
space demand for each household after abolishing space-linked property tax 
system was calculated by assuming the same property tax rate for all sizes of 
houses and then the difference between desired floor space after the revision 
and under the current system was computed. Finally the ratio between this 
difference and the desired floor space under the current differential tax system 
was computed.  
 
Clearly, abolishing spaced-linked property taxation for newly built houses 
increases the floor space demand under both models, though the difference is 
not large. Households distort their floor consumption by underconsuming 
quantity of floor space under the current Japanese differential property tax 
treatment. 
  
With this result, we now compute the Dead-Weight Loss of the Japanese 
housing tax system under the kinked budget constraint model using  
Equivalent Variation (EV).  DWL is defined as the difference between EV and 
the amount of subsidies paid under the present differential property tax 46  Seko 
   
system, where EV is defined as the maximum lump sum the individual would 
be willing to be paid  instead of subsidies on floor space. We calculate the 
amount of subsidies at the individual’s optimum choice level under the actual 
tax system. In our model, corresponding to the linear desired floor demand 
function (9), the direct utility function is 
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function and the expenditure function used are as follows:     
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where 
F P  is the virtual price of the floor space. For each i–th household, 
desired floor space demand under the present system
i F
*  and corresponding 
desired consumption 
i C
*  were determined using (1)(2)(9) based on the 
parameter values in Table 2. Then (14)(15)(16) were used to compute EV
6.  
 
The excess burden of the floor space demand is 3,000 yen in the linear budget 
constraint model
7. But the linear budget constraint model does not capture 
the true effect. The true excess burden of the floor space demand is 25,000 
yen per household at 1993 prices and the amount of subsidies paid under the 
present differential property tax system is 13,000 yen per household at 1993 
prices based on the kinked budget constraint model. The true excess burden 
of the floor space demand is approximately 78,035 million yen for all owner-





                                                 
5 See Blomquist (1983) and Hausman (1980) for details. 
6 See Hausman (1981, 1984), van Soest et al. (1990) for details. 
7 The DWL under the linear budget constraint model was calculated based on the 
following formula: 
{ } i i iP i i i Q P P P P DWL
i · · · - · =
* 2 ' / ) ( 5 . 0 e   where 
i P i
* e  is the expected compensated price 
elasticity of  demand for the i-th good,  i P  is its price before changing the system,  i Q  is 
the quantity demanded and  '
i P  is its price after changing the system. 
   Property Taxation and the Demand for Floor Space in Japan 47 
 
In  this paper, we present a microeconomic model of Japanese housing 
demand focusing on the nonlinear and nonconvex budget constraints 
peculiar to the Japanese housing tax system.   We estimate the structural form 
using the maximum likelihood estimation for floor space demand. We find that 
the price and income elasticities are –0.22 and 0.17. 
 
Using the result from the MLE, we try to predict how the floor space 
decisions of home purchasers would change if space-linked property taxation 
for newly built houses are abolished. Under the current system, households 
distort their housing consumption by underconsuming quantity of floor 
space and paying an excess tax burden of 25,000 yen per household at 1993 
prices.   It is approximately 78,035 million yen for all owner-occupied 
households at 1993 prices.   
 
I wish to thank Professors Luis C. Mejia, Ko Wang and three anonymous 
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